A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East

Nicely presented with facts and analysis. However, Paperback version has small font size which strains the eyes.

A necessity for anyone having any interest in World-History :)

The book is no doubt good, but the printing quality is also okay

This is also a fake copy. I lost my original which is why I ordered a second copy. Please replace with the original copy of the book

Questo libro e bellissimo. Se si vuole capire qualcosa sulla Prima Guerra Mondiale che vada oltre i libri di testo di scuola bisogna leggerlo. Con la scusa di parlare della guerra sul fronte Ottomano, l’autore di fatto scrive una storia della Prima Guerra Mondiale incentrato non sulke battaglie ma sulla politica che ha influenzato l’andamento della guerra. Due cose appaiono in modo originale. Primo: la guerra sarebbe potuta finire prima (forse nel 1917) se Churchill e Loyd George avessero potuto far prevalere la loro strategia. Secondo: Laurence d’Arabia tanto osannato come eroe ne esce con le ossa rotte, risulta essere un impostore, un millantatore di successi mai avuti. Per capire questo leggere il libro ne vale veramente il prezzo.

Es habe. so schließt David Fromkin, nach dem Fall des weströmischen Reiches 1500 Jahre gebraucht, bis sich eine allgemein akzeptierte Staatenordnung in Europa herausbildete. nach dem Fall des osmanischen Reiches 1917/18 könnte es ähnlich lange dauern. Die Friedensordnung von Sykes- Picot-sasonnov ist jedenfalls keine Ordnung, die von den Betroffenen als legitim akzeptiert wird. im Kernbereich des Abkommens - Syrien, Irak, Libanon. Jordanien, Israel und Palästina sind Staaten entstanden, deren Existenzrecht alltäglich, innerlich, äußerlich, wechselseitig in Frage steht. Warum es so kam, erschließt Fromkin in typisch angelsächsischer Erzählkunst mit Spannungsmoment und anekdotenoriginalität. Erstens ist die Ordnung des nahen Ostens entlang der Erfordernisse längst untergegangener Weltreiche definiert. Zweitens: die Handelnden selbst glaubten schlussendlich nicht an die Zielführung ihrer Bemühungen. Sir Mark Sykes nahm die Skepsis über das mit seinem Namen verbundene Abkommen 1918 mit ins Grab. Drittens: die völlige Ignoranz der Akteure gegenüber dem Lokalkolorit, auch der Religion. Lord Kitchener meinte, die Einsetzung eines haschemitischen Kalifen könne die Moslems für die alliierte Sache gewinnen. Viertens formte das britische Empire seine nahostkoalitionen mit sehr fragwürdigen Bündnispartnern und Techniken: feisal-, Abdullah- Hussein, Lawrence von Arabien, waren schwache bis gefährliche Bündnispartner oder Protagonisten. Palästina wurde drei Mächten gleichzeitig versprochen, jeweils aus augenblickserwägungen. Unter den Hypothesen des Autoren finden sich auch einige Extravaganzen. So die These, die balfour-Deklaration fusse auf dem Glauben an eine jüdische weltverschwörung, um die einflussreichen zionistischen Kreise in den Hauptstädten der Mittelmächte zum Umsturz zu bewegen, habe man ein Angebot machen müssen. Unglaublich oder wahr? Die staaten von Sykes/Pilot sind dysfunktional. möglicherweise wird es keine vollen 1500 Jahre dauern, bis sich die alte Welt neu sortiert. es wird Gewinner- und verliererstaaten geben, wie Burgund oder Savoyen. dass die windschiefen Gebäude des Iraks oder syriens diesen Prozess überstehen werden, fällt nach Lektüre dieses Buchs schwer. Höchstens als Hülle falsch verstandener unverletzlichkeitsdogmen des Völkerrechts haben diese Staaten eine Zukunft. territorial verfasster Zynismus des ersten Weltkriegs.

The book arrived in heart time and great condition. I am looking forward to reading it.

I was looking for a book to give me some background on the ongoing, and seemingly unending, conflict in the Middle East. After checking out a large selection of books, and authors, I settled on this one, and, so far I have not been disappointed. The amount of research that has gone into this book is epic! The amount of detail is almost mind boggling. Fromkin puts to rest the common perception that there is a simple cause and a simple solution to most situations. There are so many players, and motivations in "The Game", as Fromkin calls it, it is impossible to tell who is allied with whom, and for how long, and what is the "end game" for each player. It seems that many of the decisions made, that have far reaching consequences, were made on the basis of misinformation, greed, and stupidity. The book also makes the political leaders in many jurisdictions look like the self centered scoundrels that they profess not to be. I find that I am not "reading" this book but rather "studying" it. I hope that the rest of the book is as good as the part that I have read already.

As I read this wonderful book, I conjured a fantasy of a White House meeting held a couple of months before the Bush Administration’s fateful 2002 decision to invade Iraq. In attendance were the usual suspects: Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Condi Rice, Colin Powell, Dick Rumsfeld, et al. But some sage attendee had also suggested the inclusion of Professor Fromkin who was asked to reflect on the notion of such an adventure in light of his study of the history of the Middle East. The professor went on for a couple of hours describing the events leading up to, and then following, the allied victory in World War One: the British change of heart about the essential integrity of the Ottoman Empire; the second and third thoughts about the Balfour Declaration; the ex parte division by the allies of the human and territorial spoils of war; the resultant festering resentment of foreign domination; the brutal machinations of the occupiers (especially the French in Algeria and elsewhere); the interwoven, ever-lasting, invariably brutal sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia…the list went on and on. The government officials sat in rapt fascination at the professor’s tale. They thanked him for his visit, and upon his departure, took just moments to conclude that any such invasion would be a historically tragic mistake. Of course, such a conclave was never convened. Despite many attendees’ knowledge of the same history Professor would have recounted, the invasion decision was taken and its predictable (if someone were listening and thinking) consequences dog us and the rest of the world to this day. We history buffs are especially enamored of Santayana’s observation that, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” But I guess governments don’t read history books, no less invite an authority on a particular region or period in for a coffee and a chat before a momentous and irreversible decision is made. More’s the pity. The upshot is this: if you believe your knowledge of the Middle East is not quite what it should be and you wonder from time to time why certain events happen and others do not in this perpetually troubled part of the world, just read this book. Then you will know what our Iraq invasion decision makers didn’t...or chose to forget.